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Robert H. Frank
* and Cass R. Sunstein
**
The movement for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory problems has proved
stunningly successful.  By Executive Order, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have
all required cost-benefit analysis of major regulations.
1  Partly as a result, agencies
routinely attempt to calculate the costs and benefits of their activities.
2  Congress has also
shown considerable interest in cost-benefit analysis, requiring both OMB and EPA to
produce monetized accounts of the consequences of regulation.
3  Courts themselves have
been highly receptive to efforts to mandate cost-benefit analysis,
4 asking agencies to
monetize costs, benefits, or both.
5 In a recent decision, the court of appeals for the D.C.
Circuit –- the most important court in federal regulatory law -- has made clear that
Congress will have to speak unambiguously if it intends to forbid consideration of cost.
6
In sum, both the executive and the judiciary have converged on a kind of default rule in
favor of cost-benefit analysis, to be used unless Congress expressly precludes it.
We believe that the movement toward cost-benefit analysis of regulatory
initiatives is generally desirable and that most of the conventional criticisms of it are
unconvincing.
7 But those who approve of cost-benefit analysis need practical ways to
measure both costs and benefits, and it is here that many questions remain, for theory and
practice alike.  Our focus is on the standard economic approach, which attempts to
estimate people’s willingness to pay for the various goods at issue.
8  We intend to
criticize this approach on the ground that it ignores a central point about valuation, thus
producing numbers that systematically undervalue the benefits of regulation.
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Policy analysts rely for the most part on two methods for estimating willingness
to pay. One is the hedonic pricing method, which attempts to infer valuations from
observable market behavior.  For example, analysts might estimate the value of safety by
examining how wages vary with workplace injury levels.
9 In the contingent valuation
approach, generally used when market evidence is unavailable, analysts ask how much
people would be willing to pay to reduce or avoid a wide range of dangers -- specific
health problems associated with ozone or particulate matter; various kinds of workplace-
related mortality risks; risks associated with air travel; risks of injury or death in
automobile accidents; and so on.
10    Relying primarily on hedonic pricing studies, but
also on contingent valuation studies, federal agencies have used estimates of the value of
a statistical life saved that range from $1.5 million (used by the FAA) to $5.8 million
(used at least once, but not consistently, by the EPA). 
11
Monetization, as measured by estimates of willingness to pay, is not limited to
mortality risks.  For example, the EPA recently provided a wide range of numbers for
health problems short of mortality.
12 It considers a risk of congestive heart failure to be
worth $20,600 for people under 65, but $16,600 for people over 65.  It considers an
episode of acute bronchitis to be worth $45; an emergency visit to the hospital for
asthma,  $9000; chronic bronchitis, $260,000; and a single episode of shortness of breath,
$5.30.  In all cases, these numbers are generated on the basis of estimates of what
affected individuals would be willing to pay to avoid negative outcomes.
For present purposes we shall simply assume that these numbers are basically
sound, in the sense that they represent good estimates of private willingness to pay. We
shall also assume that private willingness to pay is, in general, the appropriate basis for
monetizing the benefits of regulation.
13  We nonetheless suggest that the actual numbers
on which federal agencies rely understate the social benefits of many regulations by a
substantial amount. It follows that important policies are being defended, and made, on
the basis of assessments that greatly undervalue the net benefits of regulatory
interventions. Where the government currently says that the value of a statistical life is
about $4 million, it ought to be saying that the value is somewhere between $4.7 million
and $7 million. At the very least, our analysis suggests that when government agencies
are unsure how to value regulatory benefits along a reasonable range, they should make
choices toward or at the upper end.
The essential reason for our claim is that people care a great deal about their
relative economic position, and not solely, and often not mostly, about their absolute
economic position.  Current estimates tell us what an individual, acting in isolation,
would be willing to pay for, say, an increase in safety on the job.  But when an individual
buys additional safety in isolation, he experiences not only an absolute decline in the
                                                   
9 See, for example,  Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the
Labor Market, in Household Production and Consumption 266 (ed. N. Terleckjz 1976).
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Stud. (forthcoming 2000).
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amounts of other goods and services he can buy, but also a decline in his relative living
standards.  In contrast, when a regulation requires all workers to purchase additional
safety, each worker gives up the same amount of other goods, so no worker experiences a
decline in relative living standards.  If relative living standards matter, then an individual
will value an across-the-board increase in safety more highly than an increase in safety
that he alone purchases.
The “willingness to pay” numbers used in the standard estimates take no account
of this difference; they are based on an implicit assumption that individuals care only
about absolute living standards, not at all about relative living standards. This assumption
is wrong. If people could maintain their relative economic position, they would be willing
to pay more, and possibly a great deal more, to purchase many of the goods that
regulation attempts to deliver. A central assumption here, which we defend in some
detail, is that income is in large part a positional good, valued in terms of relative
position, whereas many regulatory benefits, such as health care, safety,  parental leave,
and leisure time, are largely or primarily nonpositional goods, valued for their own sake
and more independently of what others have.  Our minimal claim, then, is that existing
numbers are too low insofar as they fail to take account of concerns about relative
economic position, and that a serious conceptual defect is thus inherent in current
approaches, one that merits much further investigation. Our more ambitious claim is that
in order to be accurate, the existing numbers should be increased substantially, and we
attempt to show how the more accurate numbers might be generated.  We hope that those
who object to that particular attempt will be motivated not to defend the implausible view
that absolute position is all that matters, but to develop more accurate ways to incorporate
positional concerns into cost-benefit analysis.
The arguments we make here go well beyond the particular area of cost-benefit
analysis. In many contexts, consumers find themselves on a positional treadmill, in which
their choices do not really make them happier or better off, but instead serve largely to
keep them in the same spot in the hierarchy.
14 Many actual and imaginable  laws can stop
or slow down the positional treadmill, thus maintaining people’s relative position while
also giving them something of value. People care about maintaining relative position not
only because of envy, status-seeking, or reputational concerns; a particularly important
point is that the frame of reference for evaluating many goods and services is set socially
rather than individually, and inevitably so.
15 For many goods and services, the holdings
and actions of other provide the frame of reference against which each person evaluates
his holdings and actions. When the frame of reference changes, evaluations will change
as well. Improvements in the frame of reference often mean that people experience
previously satisfactory goods and services as undesirable, a kind of prisoner’s dilemma
that may be best solved through law. We will discuss a number of examples here. While
our focus is on cost-benefit analysis, an especially salient current topic, our discussion
bears on many other problems as well.
This essay comes in several parts.  Part I traces the rise of cost-benefit analysis
within the national government, gives a sense of the numbers that government institutions
are now using, and briefly explains how those numbers have been chosen.  Part II
                                                   
14 See Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 American
Economic Review 101 (1985).
15 See Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference As A Public Good, 107 Economic Journal 1832 (1996).4
discusses the central importance of relative economic position to people’s perceptions of
their own well-being.  Part III explores how some of the key benefit calculations would
be altered by an understanding of the importance of relative position. Part IV discusses
several theoretical issues, focusing on the objection that positional concerns should play
no role in public policy. Part V explores some limits and extensions of our argument. We
consider the implications of the fact that many regulatory programs benefit not all people
but subclasses, and we discuss how positional concerns help justify nonwaivable
contractual terms in employment law. Part VI is a brief conclusion.
I. The Growth of Cost-Benefit Analysis
In this section, we outline the rise of cost-benefit analysis, as produced by the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the national government. The general
lesson is that we are fast approaching the end of a “first generation” debate, between
advocates and critics of cost-benefit analysis, with general victory for the advocates.
16 At
the same time, we have only started to enter into the equally important “second
generation” debate, over the appropriate method for valuing costs and benefits. Hence
neither Congress nor courts have given even minimal guidance for valuing regulatory
benefits, and there is a great deal of unexplained disparity even within the practices of
those agencies firmly committed to cost-benefit principles.
A. Executive Branch: A Presidential “Supermandate,”
But Without Specifying Values
During the last twenty years, cost-benefit analysis has become a prominent
practice within the executive branch of the national government. Though economic
advisers have attempted to ensure cost-benefit review since the Nixon Administration,
17
the cost-benefit principle did not receive prominent recognition until Executive Order
12291,
18 issued by President Reagan in 1981. The purpose of this executive order was to
ensure that all major rules would be subject to cost-benefit analysis and that such analysis
would be the “basis” of decision, at least to the extent permitted by law.
19 At the same
time, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was entrusted with the power to
oversee agency cost-benefit analyses to ensure their basic rationality and sense.
20 The
movement in the direction of cost-benefit analysis was much accelerated in 1985 with the
issuance of Executive Order 12498,
21 requiring that cost-benefit analysis provide the
basis for an “annual regulatory plan” to be issued by all executive agencies.  It was
                                                   
16 By this we mean both a political victory and an intellectual victory. One of us has criticized some
defenses of cost-benefit analysis on the ground that they wrongly assume the “commensurability” of  all
social goods, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability  and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 842
(1994). But this criticism is not meant as an objection to the comparison of costs and benefits as a policy
tool, designed to discipline inquiry. See id. at 842. We are concerned here  with cost-benefit analysis as a
policy tool, and for that purpose it is not necessary to engage  other, more abstract debates on the nature of
human valuation..
17 See Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 13-14
(1995).
183 CFR 128 (1981).
19 Id
20 Id
213 CFR 323 (1985).5
pursuant to this executive order that annual volumes, often containing OMB instructions
for the valuation of risks, became a prominent basis for understanding federal regulatory
activity.
22
Many people doubted whether President Clinton would endorse the idea that
regulatory judgments should be made with close reference to cost-benefit balancing.
Despite the misgivings of some environmental organizations, President Clinton's
Executive Order 12866,
23 issued in 1993, firmly embraced cost-benefit analysis as a
central ingredient in regulatory decisions. The Order does shift, in certain ways, from the
Reagan-Bush initiatives, principally via references to "equity" and "distributive impacts"
as relevant factors in agency analysis.
24 But these are modest changes in a presidential
requirement that continues to require cost-benefit analysis of major rules. Thus the
executive branch has endorsed cost-benefit balancing for over twenty years, and it seems
reasonable to suggest that insofar as the White House is overseeing the federal regulatory
process, cost-benefit analysis will continue to play a central organizing role, no matter the
party affiliation of the president.
Notwithstanding this point, a key limitation in the current process within the
executive branch is the absence of an agreed-upon system for assessing the relevant
values.
25 As we shall soon see, agency practices are widely divergent. OMB has
attempted to discipline agency inquiry, but only through unenforced and somewhat vague
guidance and occasional intervention,
26 and without much of an underlying theory aside
from general reliance on private “willingness to pay.”
B. Courts: A Cost-Benefit Default Principle
The executive branch has not acted alone. In one of the most noteworthy
developments in the last twenty years of administrative law, courts have also enforced a
form of cost-benefit balancing, at least where Congress has not barred them from doing
so.
27 Indeed, the most dramatic innovation, noted above, is a new doctrine permitting and
possibly even requiring cost-benefit analysis unless Congress has expressly directed
otherwise.
28 Federal law now reflects a kind of default principle: Agencies will consider
costs, and thus undertake cost-benefit analysis, if Congress has not unambiguously said
that they cannot.
Thus judges have invalidated regulatory action that imposes high costs without
significant benefits.
29 They have also policed agency action to ensure at least a rough kind
                                                   
22 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government,
1985-1986; for OMB’s most recent statement, see OMB, Guidance to Regulatory Agencies (on file with
the authors). Like all other governmental bodies, OMB ignores positional considerations in its effort to
state “best practices” for cost-benefit analysis.
233 CFR 638 (1993).
24 Id.
25 For a complaint in this vein, see Robert W Hahn, Assessing the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analyses
(unpublished manuscript 2000). See OMB, supra note, for effort to codify “best practices”; but OMB’s
guidance is merely that, and hence has no binding quality.
26  See Thomas O. McGarrity, Reinventing Rationality: The role of regulatory analysis in the federal
bureaucracy (Cambridge 1991).
27See note supra; Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1991).
28 Michigan v. EPA, 2000 US App LEXIS 3209 (DC Cir, March 3, 2000).
29 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1991); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th
Cir. 1992). American Petroleum Institute, 448 US; is in the same general spirit.  There the plurality held6
of proportionality between costs and benefits.
30 Sometimes courts have been quite
aggressive in requiring proportionality as part of their function in reviewing agency
action to test whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."
31 Courts have
insisted that some amounts of money are too much to spend for small benefits.
32 On the
other hand, they have failed to give much guidance for deciding, in general, when a great
deal is too much. Here, as within the executive branch, the appropriate valuation of
regulatory benefits has received exceedingly little attention.
C. Congress and the Failed Supermandate
Executive and judicial developments do not mean that the regulatory state is now
routinely subject to scrutiny for conformity with cost-benefit criteria.
33 Presidents and
courts have circumscribed authority; they must act consistently with federal statutes,
which often forbid cost-benefit balancing. Consider, for example, the Clear Air Act
34, the
Clean Water Act
35, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
36, the Delaney Clause
37, and
the Safe Water Drinking Act
38, many of whose provisions ban agencies from balancing
costs against benefits. It is partly for this reason that the American regulatory state
contains many regulations imposing high costs not justified by corresponding benefits.
39
Hence much of the contemporary interest in regulatory reform has been directed
toward Congress. Consider the fact that in the mid-1990s, repeated efforts were made to
impose a “supermandate” that would require all agencies to undertake cost-benefit
analysis and to make decisions on the basis of that analysis.
40 Notably, these proposals
included no guidance for the valuation of life and other benefits from regulation. Partly
because of irreconcilable legislative differences over the question of valuation, the
proposed supermandate was defeated. But the national legislature has not uniformly
rejected cost-benefit balancing. In the area of health and environmental protection, two
important statutes, involving toxic substances and pesticides, contemplate a form of cost-
benefit analysis.
41  More recently and more globally, the Unfunded Mandates Act
contains two relevant provisions, imposed on all regulatory activity.
42 First, significant
regulatory actions must be accompanied by a statement that includes "a qualititative and
                                                                                                                                                          
that OSHA must show a “significant risk” before regulating a toxic substance. The Court subsequently held
that OSHA need not engage in cost-benefit analysis. But in asserting the need for a demonstration of a
significant risk, the plurality emphasized that an alternative view would allow “the imposition of significant
cost for little, if any, discernible gain.” Id. at XX
30 See note supra.
315 USC 706.
32 See note supra.
33 Thomas McGarrity, supra note.
34 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1989).
35 33 USC § 1251 et. seq (1994).
36 29 USC §651 et seq. (1994).
37 21 USC §§ 348 (c)(3)(1), 360b(d)(1)(I), 379e(b)(5)(B).
38 42 USC §§300j-8(d) (1988).
39See Robert Hahn, Risks, Costs, and Lived Saved (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1993).
40 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
247 (1996).
41See Toxic Substances Control Act (15 USC 2601 et seq); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136 et seq.).
42 5 USC 15327
quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the Federal mandate."
43
Second, all agencies must "identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives and from those alternatives select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule."
44 These provisions
enshrine a form of cost-benefit analysis for major rules; but in keeping with the pattern
that we have seen thus far, they are silent on how agencies are supposed to value the
goods at stake.
D. Practice
What have agencies actually done when they have done cost-benefit analysis? It is
clear that the general practice is to build on some version of the contingent valuation and
hedonic pricing methods discussed above. Thus agencies attempt to measure people’s
willingness to pay, using actual choices if possible, and contingent valuation if necessary.
It is on the basis of this sort of analysis that the EPA recently compiled the following
table
45:
Table 1  Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (Mean Values)
Health Endpoint Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 $)
Mortality
    Life saved
    Life year extended
$4.8 million
$120,000
Hospital Admissions:
     All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages
     Pneumonia, age < 65
     COPD, age > 65
     Ischemic Heart Disease, age < 65
     Congestive Heart Failure, age > 65
     Emergency Visits for Asthma
$12,700
$13,400
$15,900
$ 20,600
$ 16,600
$9,000
Chronic Bronchitis $260,000
Upper Respiratory Symptoms $19
Lower Respiratory Symptoms $12
Acute Bronchitis $45
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19) $18
Asthma $32
Shortness of Breath $5.30
Sinusitis and Hay Fever Not monetized
Work Loss Days $83
Restricted Activity Days (RAD)
     Minor RAD
     Respiratory RAD
$38
not monetized
Worker Productivity $1 per worker per 10% change in ozone
Visibility: residential
                 Recreational
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per household
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease in deciview per
household (see U.S. EPA, 1997a)
Household Soiling Damage $2.50 per household per _g/m
3
                                                   
432 USC 202(a)(2).
442 USC 202 (a)(3)-(4). Of course a cost-effectiveness  principle should not be identified with a cost-benefit
requirement. The idea that agencies should seek the lowest cost way of achieving a goal is narrower and
less controversial than the idea that agencies should compare costs with benefits.
45 Innovative Strategies Group, Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis, Ozone and
Particulates (1998).8
But there is also a great deal of variation both within and across agencies. With
respect to statistical lives, consider the following table
46:
Table 2: Valuations of Life
AGENCY REGULATION CITATION VALUE
($ M)
Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration
Proposed Establishment of the
Harlingen Airport Radar
Service Area, TX
55 FR 32064
August 6, 1990
1.5
Department of Agriculture –
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Pathogen Reduction: Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control
Point Systems
61 FR 38806
July 25, 1996
1.6
Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and
Adolescents
61 FR 44396
August 28, 1996
2.5
Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in
Pilot Training, Testing, and
Checking and at Training
Centers
61 FR 34508
July 2, 1996
2.7
Environmental Protection
Agency
Protection of Stratospheric
Ozone
53 FR 30566
August 12, 1988
3
Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Proposed Rules to Amend the
Food Labeling Regulations
56 FR 60856
November 27,
1991
3
Department of Transportation –
Federal Aviation Administration
Financial Responsibility
Requirements for Licensed
Launch Activities
61 FR 38992
July 25, 1996
3
Department of Agriculture –
Food and Nutrition Service
Proposed National School
Lunch Program and School
Breakfast Program
59 FR 30218
June 10, 1994
1.5, 3.0
Environmental Protection
Agency
National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter
62 FR 38652
July 18, 1997
4.8
Environmental Protection
Agency
National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone
62 FR 38856
July 18, 1996
4.8
Department of Health and
Human Services – Food and Drug
Administration
Medical Devices: Current Good
Manufacturing Practice
61 FR 52602
October 7, 1996
5
Department of Health and
Human Services – Public Health
Service, Food and Drug
Administration
Quality Mammography
Standards
62 FR 55852
October 28, 1997
5
Environmental Protection
Agency
Requirements for Lead-Based
Paint Activities in Target
Housing and Child-Occupied
Facilities
61 FR 45778
August 29, 1996
5.5
Environmental Protection
Agency
National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations:
Disinfectants and Disinfection
Byproducts
63 FR 69390
December 16,
1998
5.6
Environmental Protection
Agency
Radon in Drinking Water
Health Risk Reduction and Cost
Analysis
64 FR 9560
February 26,
1999
5.8
                                                   
46 Borrowed from Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000).9
We do not intend to give a full answer to the question of which of these numbers
is appropriate. But we do mean to identify a substantial problem with current practice, a
problem with which agencies have yet to come to terms or even to acknowledge.
II. The Importance of Relative Position
We now attempt to show that relative economic position is important for people’s
subjective and objective well-being, and that absolute economic position is less
significant than is ordinarily thought. For purposes of establishing our minimal
proposition here, it is necessary only to establish that willingness-to-pay numbers
undervalue safety and other benefits if they ignore concerns about relative position.
(Notice that we are assuming a point that we will defend below: For many regulatory
benefits, positional considerations are less important than they are for income.) We draw
on a wide array of evidence in order to establish this point. Of course each piece of
evidence is vulnerable to counterarguments, at least if taken on its own; and we will not
be reluctant to mention some counterarguments here.  But taken as a whole, the evidence
strongly suggests that traditional methods of estimating willingness to pay seriously
understate the social value of many regulatory benefits.
A. Survey Evidence
1. A Thought Experiment. Consider two hypothetical worlds:
World A:  You earn $110,000 per year, others earn $200,000
World B: You earn $100,000 per year, others earn $85,000.
The income figures represent real purchasing power.  Thus your higher income in World
A would enable you to purchase a house that is 10 percent larger than the house you
would be able to afford in World B, 10 percent more restaurant meals, and so on.  Faced
with a once-for-all choice between these two worlds, which would you choose?
The economic theory that underlies cost-benefit analysis suggests that World A is
the uniquely correct choice. The question unambiguously specifies that the income
figures represent real purchasing power, and hence prices would not be higher in World
A than World B. Neoclassical economics rests on the assumption that people derive
satisfaction primarily from the absolute quantity of goods and services they consume.  On
that measure, World A is better because it offers higher absolute consumption for every
citizen. (For choosers who do not want higher levels of consumption, no matter; they
might put the money in the bank for their children, or give it to their favorite charity.)
That fact notwithstanding, however, a substantial proportion of people confronted with
this choice say they would opt for World B.
47
                                                   
47See, for example, Sara J. Solnick and David Hemenway, Is More Always Better? A Survey on Positional
Concerns, 37 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 373 (1998). When these authors offered
subjects a choice similar to the one we posed above, 56 percent chose the world with higher relative income
and lower absolute income. Similar numbers – with about half opting for higher relative income -- have
emerged from several experiments, with about 200 subjects, involving law students at the University of
Chicago Law School.
In a recent discussion of these experiments, Judge Posner complains, "[R]elative income is
important as a signal of ‘how one is doing.’ If your boss is paying you a lot less than someone who does10
We do not claim that theirs is necessarily the better choice.  But we do argue that
it is a rational and coherent one, in part because of the importance of what the late
economist Fred Hirsch called positional goods.
48  A positional good is one whose value
depends in significant part on how it compares with goods in the same class consumed by
others.  The ability to purchase such goods depends strongly on one’s position in the
relevant distribution of income.  For example, one’s ability to buy a fine painting or a
house with a good view typically depends more on relative income than on absolute
income.  But such goods are not the only reason that relative income is important.  Some
people want to be toward the top of any relevant hierarchy; many more do not want to be
at the bottom; and below we will discuss evidence that once a threshold level of affluence
is reached, physical and psychological well-being are much better predicted by relative
consumption levels than by absolute consumption levels.
49
2. The Happiness Surveys. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the importance of
relative position comes in the form of happiness surveys conducted over time in a variety
of countries.  These surveys ask people to report whether they are "very happy," "fairly
happy," or "not happy." They find that happiness levels within a country at a given
moment are strongly positively correlated with relative position in the country's income
distribution.  But the same studies find only weak long-term trends in average reported
happiness levels, even for countries whose incomes have been growing steadily over
time. The counterintutive conclusion is that substantial increases in economic growth do
not produce substantial increases in subjective well-being.
In the early studies, Richard Easterlin found little relationship between increases in
material living standards and subjective well-being.
50 More particularly, Easterlin found
three important patterns in the data. First, average satisfaction levels within a given
country are stable over time, even in nations experiencing significant economic growth.
Second, satisfaction levels across individuals within a given country do vary with
income. Richer people are, on average, more satisfied than poorer people within the same
nation. Third, average reported satisfaction levels are not well-correlated with average
levels of national income. Nations with high levels of average income do not show higher
average satisfactions than nations with lower levels of average income.  In Easterlin’s
view, these patterns tend to suggest that relative income is far more important than
absolute income in determining people’s subjective well-being.
More recently, it has been found that at very low levels of poverty, increases in
absolute income do tend to increase self-reported happiness.
51 When people lack adequate
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and prospects.” Richard Posner, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2000). The point is correct but not responsive.
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48 Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Harvard Univ. Press, 1976).
49For an extensive summary of this evidence, see R. H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond, chapter 2 (Oxford
University Press. 1985).
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Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, Paul David and Melvin Reder, eds., (Academic
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food or shelter, they are likely to report themselves as happier as economic growth
reduces those needs. It has also been found that average satisfaction levels are
significantly higher in rich countries than in very poor ones.
52 But the basic pattern
identified by Easterlin continues to hold: average satisfaction levels are not significantly
correlated over time with income.
3. Questions and puzzles. At a minimum, these findings demonstrate that relative
income is more important than absolute income as a determinant of self-reported
happiness levels. But several questions might be raised about their implications for our
claims here.
First, what is the relationship between self-reported happiness and subjective
happiness? Is anything real being measured? Self-reported happiness might seem to
invite social comparisons; people might rate their happiness by asking how they compare
to others, and hence substantial differences in happiness levels, between wealthy and less
wealthy nations, might not be picked up by the responses even if substantial differences
exist. It is thus possible that subjective happiness measures are simply void of normative
significance.
Plausible in the abstract, this objection turns out to be wrong, or at best greatly
overstated, for there is considerable evidence that self-reported happiness does measure
something of significance. Numerous studies have found strong positive relationships
between reported happiness levels and observable physiological and behavioral measures
of well being.
53  People who report that they are not happy, for example, are more likely
to experience headaches, rapid heartbeat, digestive disorders, and related psychosomatic
ailments.
54  Those who rate themselves as very happy are more likely than others to be
rated as happy by their friends, more likely to initiate social contacts, less likely to seek
psychological counseling, and less likely to attempt suicide.
55
A second question involves the relationship between subjective happiness and
objective well-being.
56  People with a greater capacity to purchase goods and services
may not be subjectively happier, but they may be far better off.  Among other things, they
are likely to be healthier and to live longer lives.
57  It is therefore reasonable to say that
people who earn $70,000, in a society where that is the median income, are likely to have
better lives, other things being equal, than people who earn $30,000, where that is the
median income – even if people in these different societies report the same subjective
happiness. The fact that people in relatively poor nations show relatively high levels of
subjective happiness may simply reflect adaptation to relative deprivation.
58
We agree that subjective happiness is not all that matters; it does not capture
everything that a society should be aiming to promote.
59 Economic growth would
certainly be desirable insofar as it increases longevity and diminishes various risks to life
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and health, even if it had no effect whatever on subjective well-being. But subjective
happiness is an important component of overall well-being, and a society whose members
mostly report themselves as “unhappy” surely has a serious problem, just as a society
whose members report themselves as “happy” is entitled to congratulate itself on this
fact. If any income loss from a regulatory intervention does not itself decrease subjective
happiness, and if the intervention confers substantial benefits, subjective and otherwise, it
would seem likely that people are gaining rather than losing; and this is sufficient for our
claims here.
A third question has to do with loss aversion.
60 It is now well-established that
people dislike losses more than they like corresponding gains.
61 It follows that
surprisingly little subjective gain may be created by increases in income, even if
equivalent decreases in income would indeed create subjective losses.
62 Perhaps people
do not report themselves as significantly happier when income increases; but this does
not show that they would not report themselves as significantly less happy when income
decreases. The point matters for our claim here, since we will be suggesting that the
economic losses associated with regulation do not matter a great deal to subjective well-
being if relative position is held constant. But loss aversion does not undermine our basic
claims. Even if people dislike losses from the status quo, they have considerable power to
adjust to those losses, and indeed their fear that losses will produce significant subjective
loss is not borne out by reality.
63  If relative position is held constant, it is extremely
unlikely that income losses, of the relatively small sort that we are discussing here, would
produce more than transitory subjective losses, especially because the relevant measures
will be producing regulatory benefits at the same time.
B. Behavioral Evidence
Survey measures of subjective well-being are not the only evidence that people
care strongly about relative income.  Unlike psychologists, who often rely on survey
evidence, economists prefer behavioral evidence when attempting to make inferences
about what people care about.  The relevant literature is not extensive, but there are
several studies that shed light on the strength of concerns about relative income.
1. The sisters study.  In a recent paper, the economists David Neumark and
Andrew Postlewaite investigate how individual labor supply decisions depend on the
incomes of important reference group members.
64  They argue that if someone cares
strongly about how her income compares with the incomes of others, an increase in
others’ incomes will cause her to become more likely to seek employment, or more likely
to work longer hours if she is already employed.  The difficulty in testing such
predictions has always been that it is hard to know whose incomes really matter to the
decision maker.  Most people presumably care most about the incomes of people with
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whom they associate most closely.  Unfortunately, researchers seldom have reliable data
about who knows whom, much less about which specific individuals people care most
about.
Neumark and Postlewaite cleverly finesse this problem by examining the behavior
of sisters. The specific question they pose is this:  Does a woman’s decision about
whether to work outside the home depend on her sister’s economic circumstances?
According to economic orthodoxy, which holds that only her own absolute income
matters to her, it would not.  But Neumark and Postlewaite find differently for a large
sample of women whose sisters are not employed.  Specifically, they find that such a
woman is 16 to 25 percent more likely to work outside the home if her sister’s husband
earns more than her own husband.
65 This is strong evidence that relative position matters
to both perceived well-being and actual behavior.
2. Employer and employee behavior.  Surveys of employers and employees
suggest that salaries depend a great deal on what employees think other people are
receiving, and that perceptions of relative position have large effects on morale.
66 “Few
workers have a precise notion of market wages or wages that are fair in some absolute
sense. Rather, they make comparisons with their own past pay and with the pay of co-
workers.”
67 As we will discuss in more detail below, the internal wage structure of firms
is highly responsive to this point, partly because employers do not want to encourage
bickering and shirking by making some workers think that they are being underpaid
relative to coworkers. In the words of an official responsible for international job
placement, “Inequity causes disharmony. Employees want more money if a new person is
paid more than they are.”
68 In the words of the director of a small company, “I have had
difficulty with people receiving different pay who had similar skills and worked in
different parts of the building. . . . They felt underpaid and undervalued.”
69 Many
companies respond to people’s concerns about relative economic position with relatively
rigid “grade and step systems.” Some companies respond by creating a norm against
public discussion of salaries, on the theory that people are likely to be happy enough with
their own, but would be less happy if they found themselves making comparisons to
others.
70 Strategies of this sort would be unintelligible if absolute position was all or
almost all that matters.
3. The ultimatum game. Concern about relative wealth also helps to explain some
otherwise puzzling behavior in interpersonal bargaining contexts. Consider, for example,
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an elegant experiment known as the "ultimatum game."
71  The game is played by two
players, "Proposer" and "Responder."  It begins with Proposer being given a sum of
money (say, $100) that he must then propose how to divide between himself and
Responder.  Responder then has two options: 1) he can accept, in which case each party
gets the amount proposed; or 2) he can refuse, in which each party gets zero and the $100
goes back to the experimenter.
If Proposer believes that Responder cares only about absolute wealth, his own
wealth-maximizing strategy is clear: he should propose $99 for himself and $1 for
Responder (only integer dollar amounts are allowed).  If Proposer's assumption about
Responder is correct, Responder will accept this one-sided offer because he will reason
that getting $1 is better than getting nothing.  This is the standard economic prediction.
But suppose that Responder cares not only about absolute but also relative wealth
levels – about the relative division of money as between the two.  Responder might then
refuse the one-sided offer, even though he stands to gain from it in absolute terms,
because he finds the relative terms so distasteful. In fact, refusals of one-sided offers are
widely observed. Responders routinely reject offers that do not involve splits of 50-50 or
60-40 -- even when the stakes are large, as in games played for several months’ salary in
poor nations.
72 Likely anticipating responders’ behavior, proposers routinely offer splits
of 50%-50% and 60%-40%. Proposers rarely offer less than 20%, and responders rarely
accept less than that amount. The existence of such results in games with large stakes
demonstrates that the outcomes cannot be discounted on the ground that the money
involved is a small fraction of total wealth.
To be sure, relative position is not all that matters in the Ultimatum Game. Much of
the  behavior is driven by Responders’ beliefs about the motivations of Proposers. When
the experiment is altered to make it seem as if Proposers have earned the right to be
Proposers, more unequal divisions are acceptable; the same is true when Proposers’
options are narrowed, making an unequal division (say, 80-20) seem more fair in light of
the alternatives (say, 10-10 or 10-90).
73 Thus a preference for good relative position does
not explain all of what occurs in the game; ensuring a fair outcome, which may or may
not call for good relative position, is often the driving factor. But relative position also
counts for many participants, so much so that “difference aversion” appears to motivate a
significant percentage of participants. That is enough for our basic claim here.
74
An obvious irony is that the effect of Proposer's believing that Responder cares about
relative wealth is to boost substantially the amount that Proposer offers Responder.  By
virtue of his concern about relative wealth, Responder becomes a much more effective
bargainer. Thus the outcomes of the ultimatum game strongly support the proposition that
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relative income, not only absolute income, matters a great deal,
75 and indeed that this
concern for relative position can strengthen bargaining positions.
4. Status experiments.  Sheryl Ball and her co-authors have shown that even
simple laboratory manipulations of relative position can have profound implications for
the terms of market exchange.
76  In one experiment, for example, they awarded half of
their subjects “stars” on the basis of their performance on a transparently meaningless
quiz.  Following these awards, subjects were given objects of known value and allowed
to exchange these objects with one another for cash.  The subjects who received stars
consistently received better terms—that is, they bought at lower prices and sold at higher
prices—when they exchanged goods with subjects who did not receive stars. It seems
clear that people with higher relative position in a salient context do better in apparently
unrelated contexts, simply because of that higher position.
C. Biological and Physiological Evidence
There is evidence that relative position affects health and even fundamental
biochemical processes in the nervous system. For reasons that remain poorly understood,
and not easily traced to a simple causal mechanism, high relative position is correlated
with good health, and low relative position with worse health – holding absolute income
constant.
77
In a study involving 19 groups of adult vervet monkeys, McGuire et al. found a
relevant mechanism: the dominant member in each group had roughly 50 percent higher
concentrations of the neurotransmitter serotonin, which affects mood and behavior in a
variety of ways.
78  They also showed that this difference was both a cause and an effect of
high status.
79  Fortunately the evidence is not limited to monkeys; McGuire and his
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colleagues have also found elevated serotonin levels in the leaders of college fraternities
and athletic teams.
80  In another study, Douglas Madsen finds that the status-serotonin
relationship is positive for some groups of male college students.
81
Like dopamine, norepinephrine, and other neurotransmitters, serotonin affects
mood and behavior in a variety of ways.  Within limits, having elevated serotonin
concentrations is associated with enhanced feelings of well-being.  Serotonin deficiencies
are associated with a variety of affective disorders, including irritability, sleep disorders,
mania, and depression.
82  Recent work suggests that serotonin deficiencies are also
strongly linked with impulsive aggression and suicide attempts.
83
In males, concentrations of the sex hormone testosterone appear to have a
relationship with status similar to the one seen for serotonin.  Reductions in status thus
tend to be followed by reductions in plasma testosterone levels, whereas these levels tend
to rise following increases in status.
84  A player who wins a tennis match decisively, for
example, experiences a post-match elevation in plasma testosterone, and his vanquished
opponent experiences a post-match reduction.
85  And as with serotonin, there is some
evidence from primate studies that elevated concentrations of testosterone facilitate
behaviors that help achieve or maintain high status.
86
To be sure, it is not simple to extrapolate from such data to judgments about the
importance of relative position with respect to income (and other goods) within all human
contexts and societies; socialization matters a great deal and can undoubtedly increase or
decrease people’s concern with their standing in the group. But there is at least plausible
reason to think that a high relative position is associated with desirable physiological
effects, and that low relative position is associated with undesirable ones.
There is a more speculative grounds to think that something like this is true. If we
adopt the biologist's view that human motivation is shaped in part by the forces of natural
selection, it is no surprise that people would care so strongly about relative resource
holdings.  Even in a famine, for example, there is always some food available, and the
question of who gets it is settled largely by relative entitlements.
87  Concern about relative
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position is also adaptive insofar at it prods people to monitor how they are doing relative
to their competitors and to boost their effort levels if they start falling behind.
88
In sum, evidence from several disciplines strongly suggests that interpersonal
comparisons are an important determinant of both physical and psychological well-being.
Such comparisons take place along many dimensions other than income.  In what
follows, however, our focus will be on comparisons in the income domain.  We
emphasize income comparisons because relative economic position is of obvious
importance and because positional concerns typically loom larger with income than with
the goods that regulation attempts to provide (safety, leisure time, leave to take care of
children and ailing relatives).  Our basic objection is that the conventional estimates used
in cost-benefit analysis of health and safety regulation are derived from models that
assume, quite implausibly, that people do not care at all about relative economic position.
This produces a serious distortion, as we shall now see.
III. How Concerns about Relative Position Affect Willingness To Pay
There is an initial question about the use of willingness to pay as a measure for
many regulatory benefits: Who is actually going to pay for them? Suppose, for example,
that government proposes to impose workplace safety requirements or to require all
employers to provide a certain period of leave time for new parents. Will the cost of these
requirements be borne by (a) workers, in the form of reduced salary (or other benefits), or
(b) consumers, in the form of increased prices, or (c) firms, in the form of reduced profits
(and perhaps reduced compensation for high-level executives), or (d) the unemployed, in
the form of lost job opportunities?
Though theoretical considerations can provide useful guidance,
89 this is of course
an empirical question; and as a general rule, decisive empirical evidence is lacking. There
is, however, evidence that at least in some cases, requirements of this sort do result in
lower wages. The workers’ compensation programs of the early twentieth century, for
example, appear to have resulted in something like a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the
earnings of nonunionized workers; the parental leave program of the early 1990s appears
to have had a similar effect.
90 For the sake of discussion, we make a simple assumption
here, without insisting that the assumption is correct: The people who benefit from
regulatory programs will also have to pay for those benefits. We suggest that even if they
do have to pay for those benefits, existing methods for eliciting their willingness to pay
substantially understate the appropriate amount, from the beneficiary’s own point of
view.
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A. The Distortion
1. Smith and Jones. To illustrate how concerns about relative position affect
willingness to pay for an amenity such as workplace safety, we begin by working through
a simple, stylized example of an employment decision confronting two workers, Smith
and Jones.  Also for simplicity’s sake, we assume that each gets satisfaction from, or
cares about, three things—his income, his safety on the job, and his position on the
economic ladder. We make no assumptions about why he cares about that position,
though we will say a few words on the point below. The choice the two confront is
between a safe job that pays $300/wk and a risky job that pays $350/wk.  The value of
safety to each is $100/wk, and each evaluates relative income as follows:  Having more
income than his neighbor provides the equivalent of $100/wk worth of additional
satisfaction; having less income than his neighbor means the equivalent of a $100/wk
reduction in satisfaction; and having the same income as his neighbor means no change in
the underlying level of satisfaction. (For purposes of understanding the general point, the
specific numbers do not matter; the same point could be illustrated in any number of
ways.)  The question is:  Which jobs will Smith and Jones choose?
If we viewed each person’s decision in isolation, the normatively correct choice
would be the safe job.  Although it pays $50/wk less than the risky job, the extra safety it
provides is worth $100/wk, by assumption.  So if we abstract from the issue of concern
about relative income, the value of the safe job is $400/wk (its $300 salary plus $100
worth of safety), which is $50/wk more than the $350 value of the risky job.
Once we incorporate concerns about relative income, however, the logic of the
decision changes in a fundamental way.  Now the attractiveness of each choice depends
on the job chosen by the other. The four possible combinations of choices and the
corresponding levels of satisfaction are shown in Table 3.
Smith
unsafe job @ $350/wk safe job @  $300/ wk
unsafe job @ $350/wk
safe job @  $300/wk $400/wk ea ch
$450/wk for Jones
$300/wk for Smith
$300/wk for Jones
$450/wk for Smith
$350/wk ea ch
Jones
Table 3.  The Effect of Concerns about Relative Income on Worker Choices
Regarding Safety
Suppose, for example, that Jones chooses the safe job.  If Smith then chooses the
unsafe job, he ends up with total satisfaction worth $450—$350 in salary plus $100 from
having more income than Jones.  Jones, for his part, ends up with only $300 worth of
total satisfaction—$300 in salary plus $100 from safety minus $100 from having lower19
income than Smith.  Alternatively, suppose Jones chooses the unsafe job.  Then Smith
again does better to accept the unsafe job, for by so doing he gets $350 worth of
satisfaction rather than only $300.  Since the payoff matrix is symmetric, each player’s
dominant strategy is to choose the unsafe job.
Armed with the standard theory of revealed preference, an analyst who observed
these choices would conclude that Smith and Jones must value the extra safety at less
than $50/wk.  After all, they could have chosen the safe job by sacrificing only $50/wk in
wages, yet they chose not to do so.  Their choices do not imply, however, that each
values safety at less than $100/wk.  Note that if each chooses a safe job, each will get
$400 worth of total satisfaction—$300 of income, $100 worth of satisfaction from safety,
and zero satisfaction from relative position.  If each had instead chosen the unsafe job,
each would have had $350 of income, zero satisfaction from safety, and each would again
have had the same level of income, so again zero satisfaction from relative position.  If
we compare the upper-left cell of Table 3 to the lower-right cell, then, we can say
unequivocally that Smith and Jones would be happier if each took a safe job at lower
income than if each chose an unsafe job with more income.  By assumption, the extra
safety is worth more ($100) than its cost ($50).
The discrepancy arises from a standard problem: the job-safety choice confronts
workers with a prisoner’s dilemma.  If our two workers could choose collectively, they
would pick the safe job, an outcome they prefer to what happens when they choose
independently.
The bias against safety illustrated in this example stems from our assumption that
well-being depends on relative income but not on relative safety.  In practice, however,
relative safety levels may also matter, since a given risk in the workplace is likely to
seem less objectionable in environments in which other similar risks are common.  A bias
against workplace safety would nonetheless result if concerns about relative income were
greater, on average, than concerns about relative safety.  Such a difference would be
expected on grounds that interpersonal safety comparisons are often precluded by the fact
that safety levels are difficult to observe. Such a difference might also be justified if, as
seems plausible, safety, far more than income, is by its nature a good whose value
depends largely, though of course not only, on absolute value. Hence what we will be
suggesting here is that many regulatory goods are less positional than income, both
because they are less easily observed and because people care about them more or less
independently of what others have or do. For some such goods, the intuition here should
be especially clear. The opportunity to spend time with an infant, for example, is valuable
regardless of how many other people have that opportunity.
2. The real world. In practice, workers must choose among many jobs, each with a
different wage and level of workplace safety.  As in the example just considered,
concerns about relative position in this more realistic setting will cause workers to choose
jobs that offer higher wages and lower safety levels than they would have chosen in the
absence of concerns about relative position.
91  From the individual worker’s vantage
point, the higher wages that accompany riskier jobs promise an improvement in both
absolute and relative consumption.  Yet when other workers make similar choices, the
relative advance each hoped to achieve does not materialize.  The incentive problem is
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analogous to the familiar stadium metaphor: all stand up to get a better view, yet no one
sees any better than if all had remained seated.
The upshot is that conventional measures of willingness to pay understate the
social benefits of additional workplace safety.  In typical applications, cost-benefit
analysts estimate the value of workplace safety by means of hedonic pricing models,
which examine how wages vary with workplace injury levels or mortality rates.
92  For
example, a hedonic pricing model might estimate that, after controlling for other relevant
factors, wages rise by 2 percent when the probability of dying in a workplace accident
falls by one in a thousand.  Analysts would infer from such an estimate that a worker
earning $50,000 per year would be would be willing to pay $1000 per year for a 0.001
reduction in the probability of death.  From that price they would then extrapolate that the
statistical value of a human life is $1,000/0.001 = $1 million.
But this procedure understates the social value of risk reduction.  What the
hedonic pricing model really tells us is that a $50,000-a-year worker would pay $1,000
for a 0.001 reduction in the probability of dying, even though the expenditure would
reduce his consumption significantly relative to those who did not make similar
expenditures on safety.  The implication is that if the worker cares about relative position,
he would be willing to pay more than $1,000 for the additional safety if the transaction
did not entail a reduction in relative consumption (as would be true if all workers bought
additional safety).
B. Removing the Distortion:
The Elasticity of Position and A Simple Solution
What has been said thus far is sufficient to show that there is a distortion; but it
does not establish its size. How big is the distortion, and how might a cost-benefit analyst
attempt to correct for it?  To answer these questions, we need to know how much an
individual’s own income would have to increase in order to fully compensate for any
negative effects caused by a general rise in the incomes of others.  More precisely, we
define the elasticity of position as the percentage by which an individual’s own income
would have to rise in order to fully compensate for the effects of a 1 percent rise in the
incomes of others in his social comparison set.  For example, if an individual would be
indifferent between the status quo and a change in which his income rose 0.5 percent
while others’ incomes rose 1 percent, the elasticity of position would be 0.5.
One way to try to estimate the elasticity of position is to employ results from
surveys in which subjects are periodically asked questions such as “What is the smallest
amount of money a family of four needs to get along in this community?”
93  In one series
of surveys, the median response to this question—expressed as a percentage of the
current year’s average disposable income for a family of four—varied between 52
percent and 33 percent, with little discernable trend.  Similar patterns have been found in
other surveys.  For example, Eugene Smolensky found that the median values of reported
estimates of "minimum-comfort" budgets for workers in New York City have hovered
around half of average per-capita national income since the beginning of the 20th
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century.
94 Lee Rainwater found that for surveys taken between 1950 and 1986, the
"income necessary to get along" has grown at about the same rate as per-capita national
income.
95
These findings suggest that the elasticity of position is 1.0—or that an
individual’s income would have to grow in the same proportion as overall income to
maintain a constant level of subjective well being.  To say that the elasticity of position is
1.0 amounts to saying that relative income is the only important economic determinant of
subjective well-being.  Although this conclusion is broadly consistent with the survey
evidence reviewed by Richard Easterlin, it is nonetheless clearly an extreme position.  If
we accept this conclusion at face value, the implication is that safety and other non-
positional regulatory benefits can be provided essentially for free!
For the reasons earlier discussed, however, we reject the conclusion that only
relative income matters, and indeed other survey evidence appears to suggest an elasticity
of position significantly less than one.  The most conservative estimate we could find
comes from a study by three Dutch economists.  Using data collected in The Netherlands,
van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (vKv) estimate an elasticity of position equal to
roughly 1/3—that is, that a family would need about a 3.3 percent increase in its real
income to compensate for a 10 percent increase in the incomes of all others in the
community.
96  For illustrative purposes, we employ this estimate to construct a simple
multiplier for adjusting willingness-to-pay values generated by hedonic pricing models.
Consider a hypothetical world in which each individual works as an independent
contractor and must decide how to apportion his income between safety and other goods.
Suppose that in this world we observe that individual workers are willing to give up 2
percent of their incomes each year in exchange for a 1 in 1000 reduction in the
probability of dying in a workplace accident.  A worker earning $50,000 per year would
thus be willing to pay $1000 per year for the additional safety, even though the
expenditure would entail a 2 percent reduction in his relative standard of living.  The vKv
estimate suggests that this worker would be willing to pay roughly $333 more for the
same increment in safety if he could be assured that his relative income would be
unaffected by the expenditure—as would be the case, for example, if everyone else made
similar expenditures on safety.  For the hypothetical world described, an adjustment
based on the vKv survey data would thus call for an upward revision by 33 percent in the
willingness to pay values inferred from hedonic pricing models.  For example, if those
models produced a value of life of $5 million, the right number would be closer to $6.7
million – to say the least, a substantial difference for purposes of regulatory law.
In practice, of course, most workers do not decide as independent contractors how
much to spend on safety.  Typically, they work in firms in which the level of safety
expenditure is the same for each worker in a given occupation.  In such environments,
joining a group with high expenditures on safety does not entail a loss of relative income
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vis-à-vis coworkers (although it does still mean having lower income relative to members
of other groups).  If one’s personal reference group consisted entirely of one’s coworkers,
the distortion caused by concerns about relative position would not arise, and
conventional hedonic estimates would not be biased.  Typically, however, an individual’s
personal reference group contains not just coworkers, but also friends, neighbors, family
members, and other acquaintances who are not in a position to participate in collective
decisions about safety expenditures.
For the sake of illustration, we consider the intermediate case of a worker whose
personal reference group consists equally of coworkers and non-coworkers.  For such a
worker earning $50,000 per year, a $1,000 per year expenditure on safety reduces relative
income by an average of 1 percent (a zero percent reduction vis-à-vis his coworkers and a
2 percent reduction vis-à-vis others).  Our adjustment based on the vKv estimate would
then be only half as large as before.  That is, the worker would be willing to pay roughly
$167 more for the same increment in safety if he could be assured that his income relative
to relevant non-coworkers would be unaffected by the expenditure—as would be the
case, again, if everyone else made similar expenditures on safety.  For this illustrative
case, an adjustment based on the vKv survey data would call for an upward revision by
17 percent in the willingness to pay values inferred from hedonic pricing models.  For
example, if those models produced a value of life of $5 million, the adjusted estimate
would be almost $6 million.
C. An Alternative Approach
1. An overview.  Many analysts may feel uncomfortable adjusting benefit estimates
on the basis of responses to survey questions regarding subjective well-being.  In this
section we examine an alternative procedure that rests not on surveys but on objective
market data – on what behavior within markets reveals about people’s value of higher
rank, or elasticity of position. If people care about relative position not just in a global
sense, but also within the context of specific groups to which they belong, it is possible to
infer the value of relative income by examining the relationship between wages, local
rank, and productivity among groups of co-workers.
97
The full story is somewhat technical. For those uninterested in the details, the simple
version begins with the suggestion that in the labor market, compensating wage
differentials must be and are paid, not only for higher risks
98 and less vacation time, but
also for lower relative positions within firms.
99  Just as in the context of risk-taking,
where the use of compensating wage differentials is well-established,
100 so too here.
Actual labor market behavior can be used to ascertain the amount that people are willing
to pay to avoid occupying positions of low rank vis-à-vis their coworkers. Compensating
wage differentials, once ascertained, can be used to adjust private willingness to pay by
incorporating concerns about relative position. We attempt an exercise to show how such
differentials might be calculated, with the qualification that a full analysis would require
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access to a fuller and more up-to-date labor market data than those used here. What is
important is the principle and the basic inquiry, not the details.
2. In general: how rank affects labor market choices. Standard labor market
theories, which assume that workers do not care about relative position, assert that wage
rates will track productivity differences on a one-to-one basis.  Thus if one worker
contributes $10/hr more than another to the employer’s bottom line, the first worker
should earn precisely $10/hr more than the second.  Yet many firms follow strict salary
formulas based on experience, education, and length of tenure within the firm, even when
there are large visible differences in the productivity of workers paid the same under
these formulas.
Such patterns can be accounted for, however, by a simple amendment to the
standard models.  The amendment rests on two assumptions: 1) other things being equal,
most people prefer high-ranked to low-ranked positions among their coworkers;  and 2)
no one can be forced to remain in a firm against his or her wishes.
101
Our account begins with the observation that, by the laws of simple arithmetic,
not everyone's preference for high rank in the wage distribution of his firm can be
satisfied.  After all, only 50 percent of the members of any group can be in the top half.
But if people are free to associate with whomever they please, why are the lesser-ranked
members of groups content to remain?  Why don't they all leave and attempt to form new
groups of their own in which they would no longer be near the bottom?  Many workers
undoubtedly do precisely that.  And yet we also observe many stable, heterogeneous
groups.  Not all accountants at General Motors are equally talented; and in every law
firm, some partners attract much more new business than others.  If everyone prefers to
be near the top of his or her group of coworkers, what holds these heterogeneous groups
together?
An important part of the answer is that their low-ranked members receive extra
compensation – partly from a prestigious association, partly from an advantageous wage
structure.  If they were to leave, they would gain by no longer having to endure low rank.
By the same token, however, the top-ranked members would lose, because they would no
longer enjoy high rank.  If their gains from having high rank are larger than the costs
borne by members with low rank, it does not make sense for the group to disband.
Everyone can do better if the top-ranked workers induce their lesser-ranked colleagues to
remain by sharing some of their pay with them.
Of course, not everyone assigns the same value to having high rank. Some people
care little or not at all about high relative rank. Some people actually dislike having more
money, or a lot more money, than their coworkers. Others consider high relative rank
extremely important. Some people do not much care about high rank, but abhor low rank.
Just as people diverge on other aspects of a compensation package, such as parental leave
and vacation time, so too they diverge on the value of a high relative rank. Those who
care little or less about high rank will do best to join firms in which the wage is high even
if, or because, they are less productive than most workers on the scene.  As lesser-ranked
members in these firms, they will receive extra compensation.  People who care most
strongly about rank, by contrast, will want to join firms in which most other workers are
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less productive than themselves.  For the privilege of occupying top-ranked positions in
those firms, they will have to work for less than the value of what they produce.
Workers can thus sort themselves among a hierarchy of firms in accordance with
their demands for within-firm status.  Figure 1 depicts the menu of choices confronting
workers whose productivity takes a given value, M0.  The heavy lines represent the wage
schedules offered by three different firms.  They tell how much a worker with a given
productivity would be paid in each firm.  The average productivity level is highest in firm
3, next highest in firm 2, and lowest in firm 1.  The problem facing persons with
productivity level M0 is to choose which of these three firms to work for.
C
B
A
Product ivit y 45°
Wage
Firm 2
Firm 1
Firm 3
Figure 1. The Wage Structure when Local Status Matters.
Workers who care most about local rank will want to "purchase" high-ranked
positions such as the one labeled "A" in Firm 1.  In such positions, they work for less
than the value of what they produce.  By contrast, those who care least about local rank
will elect to receive wage premiums (of one or another magnitude) by working in low-
ranked positions such as the one labeled "C" in Firm 3.  Workers with moderate concerns
about local rank will be attracted to intermediate positions such as the one labeled "B" in
Firm 2, for which they neither pay nor receive any compensation for local rank.
Note also in Figure 1 that even though not every worker in each firm is paid the
value of what he or she produces, workers taken as a group nonetheless do receive the
value of what they produce.  The extra compensation received by each firm's low-ranked
workers is exactly offset by the shortfall in pay of its high-ranked workers.  There is thus
an implicit market for high-ranked positions in the firm.  Buyers in this market are those
who purchase the right to occupy such positions by agreeing to work for less than the
value of what they produce.  Sellers in this market are those who agree to occupy low-
ranked position (without which high-ranked positions cannot exist) in return for being
paid more than the value of what they produce.  By observing the deviations between pay
and productivity within groups of workers in the firm, the analyst can infer the monetary
value that people assign to high local rank.
3. Compensating differentials for relatively lower rank. How large are the
compensating wage differentials for lower rank within the firm?  If we knew the answer
to that question, we could use it in an attempt to estimate the monetary cost of a reduction25
in relative position—the essential piece of information we need to adjust conventional
estimates of the monetary value of safety and other workplace amenities. Of course the
amount that workers are willing to pay for high local rank will be different for different
occupations.  In occupations in which coworkers do not associate closely with one
another, people will not be willing to pay much for a high-ranked position.  After all, the
comparisons that matter most are those between people who interact most intensively.
The price paid for high rank (and received for low rank) will be highest in occupations in
which coworkers work closely together for extended periods.
The amended model predicts that the wage will rise by less than a dollar for each
extra dollar of value produced, and that the difference between productivity and pay will
increase with the extensiveness of interaction between coworkers.
102  The predictions of
the standard model are contrasted with those of the amended model in Figure 2.
Local rank model with more intensive interaction
Local rank model with less intensive interaction
Wage = P roductivity (sta ndard model)
Product ivit y
45°
Wage
Figure 2.  Wage Schedules and the Intensity of Interaction.
Table 4 presents estimates of the rates at which earnings rise with productivity for
three occupations.
103  The occupations are listed in increasing order of closeness of
interaction.  Real estate salespersons, who have the least intensive contact, pay the lowest
amounts for high-ranked positions.  At the other end of the spectrum, research chemists,
who work together in close-knit groups for extended periods, pay very large sums indeed.
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In the sample studied, the most productive chemists accounted for over $200,000 more in
revenues each year than their least productive colleagues, yet received only slightly
higher salaries.  Auto salespersons do not associate nearly as intensively as chemists, but
unlike real estate salespersons, they do spend their working hours together in the same
location.  And as predicted, the price of high-ranked positions for auto salespersons lies
between those of the other two occupations.
Table 4.  Pay vs. Productivity for Three Occupations.
Extra earnings per extra dollar of productivity
Occupation Actual Predicted by standard model
Real estate sales $0.70 $1
Auto sales $0.24 $1
Research chemists less than $0.09 $1
Source: Frank, 1984.
4. Calculating the proper multiplier. We propose the following procedure for
generating an estimate of the lower bound of the extent to which concerns about local
rank contribute to wage compression.  (That number will then serve as the basis for our
estimate of the extent to which concerns about relative position reduce willingness to pay
for safety and other amenities.)  We start with the assumption that real estate agents
assign no value at all to their income rank vis-à-vis coworkers.  This is an exaggeration,
to be sure, but perhaps not a serious one in light of the fact that agents spend relatively
little time in one another’s company.  Since real estate agents’ earnings grow by 70 cents
for every dollar they generate for their employers, our assumption implies that factors
other than concern about local rank reduce the slope of the wage-productivity gradient by
0.30—from 1.0 to 0.70.
104 In the absence of any adjustment, the entry for research
chemists in Table 4 says that the salary of a member of this group will rise by less than 9
cents with every additional dollar of productivity.  To simplify, we round up to 10 cents.
Applying the 0.30 adjustment, we then estimate that a chemist’s salary would rise by 40
cents with every additional dollar of productivity if all factors unrelated to local rank
could be controlled for.  On this estimate, a university research chemist would be roughly
indifferent between the following two events: a) he and his colleagues each receive a
$10,000 increase in salary; and b) he receives a $4,000 increase in salary while his
colleagues’ salaries remain the same.
The amount a worker is willing to pay for an improvement in local rank within
the firm is an understatement of the value of improved relative position more generally,
because coworkers are just one of many personal reference groups that matter.  Thus, as
noted earlier, the income and consumption levels of neighbors, friends, family members,
and others are also important components of the overall social frame of reference.
Anyone who takes a cut in pay to gain a high ranked position vis-à-vis his coworkers will
simultaneously suffer reduced income and consumption rank in those other groups.
Accordingly, the amount that workers are willing to sacrifice to hold high-ranked
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positions among their coworkers should be smaller than the value they place on having
high relative position more generally.
The extent to which willingness to pay for local rank understates the value of
overall relative position will vary inversely with the intensity of coworker interaction.  In
the extreme case of a firm whose workers were hermetically sealed off from the rest of
the world, the observed willingness to pay for high local rank would coincide exactly
with the value that workers assign to relative position more generally.  In practice, of
course, no such firm exists.  Among the three cases examined in Table 4, not even the
relatively insular world of research chemists would exempt these workers from
unfavorable comparisons outside the workplace.  To the extent that external comparisons
are of at least marginal importance even for members of this group, their observed
willingness to pay for local rank will understate their willingness to pay for overall
relative position.  A research chemist’s willingness to pay for local rank (adjusted in the
manner described above) is thus a good candidate for use in the construction of a lower-
bound estimate of the value of overall relative position.  Our estimate, again, is that such
a worker would be indifferent between a $10,000 across-the-board salary increase and a
$4,000 increase that applied to him alone.
Our next step is to use this estimate to construct an adjustment in the valuation of
safety suggested by conventional methods.  Consider again a worker who earns $50,000
per year and is shown by hedonic pricing studies to have a reservation price of $1,000 per
year for a one-in-a-thousand reduction in his annual probability of dying in a workplace
accident.  Assuming that he and his coworkers spend equal amounts on workplace safety,
this payment does not reduce his consumption relative to that of his coworkers, but it
produces a $1,000 reduction relative to other members of his personal reference group.
For the sake of illustration, we again consider the intermediate case of a worker
whose personal reference group consists equally of coworkers and non-coworkers.  For
this worker, a $1,000 expenditure on safety reduces relative income by an average of 1
percent (a zero percent reduction vis-à-vis his coworkers and a 2 percent reduction vis-à-
vis others).  The cost of the additional safety for this worker may thus be expressed as the
sum of two components: the $1,000 direct expenditure on safety plus the implicit cost of
a 1 percent ($500/yr) reduction in relative income.
105  What is the latter cost?  Our earlier
estimate tells us that this worker would be indifferent between a $1,000 across-the-board
reduction in income and a $400 reduction that applied to him alone, implying that he
would be also be indifferent between a $1,250 across-the-board reduction and a $500
reduction that applied to him alone.  A $500 reduction that applied to him alone, in turn,
would impose two costs—a reduction in absolute living standards by that amount and the
corresponding reduction in relative living standards.  Using CA(500) to represent the first
cost, and CR(500) to represent the second, we have
CA(500) + CR(500) = $1,250.
Since the value of CA(500) is simply $500, we solve for CR(500) = $750.  Under our
maintained assumptions, then, the implicit value of a $500 reduction in relative income is
$750.  It follows that if this worker were willing to pay $1,000 for a one-in-a-thousand
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reduction in the probability of death despite the implied 1 percent reduction in his relative
standard of living, he would be willing to pay $750 more for that same benefit if it could
be provided without a reduction in relative living standards.  Thus, for cases in which
conventional estimates would peg the value of a life at $5,000,000 on the basis of
observed individual willingness to pay, our estimate would imply a social valuation that
is 75 percent larger, or $8,750,000 per life.
Needless to say, the back-of-the-envelope nature of this estimate, based on a
much less than full inquiry into the contemporary labor market, lays it open to criticism.
Considerable work remains to be done before the value of relative position can be
estimated with any precision.
106  Our basic claim is not that we have isolated the precise
number, but that even a back-of-the-envelope calculation is likely to be a closer estimate
than we would get by simply ignoring concerns about relative position.  Even crude
estimates like the ones described suggest that ignoring concerns about relative position
has led to significant underestimates of the social benefit of reductions in risks to health
and safety.
IV. Should Public Policy Address Problems that Stem from Concerns about Relative
Position?
Our argument has been based on a claim about the harmful external effects
introduced by the increased income of other people. In our account, increases in the
wages of some people impose costs on others. In form, this is a simple externality story,
of the sort that has become quite conventional in many areas of law and policy.
Economists and noneconomists alike accept the proposition that market allocations may
be suboptimal when production is accompanied by the discharge of environmental
pollutants, and most concede that air and water quality are proper concerns of public
policy.  Our suggestion here is that because subjective well-being depends on relative
wealth, increases in the income of some people give rise to positional externalities.
107
Analytically, positional externalities are no different from ordinary environmental
pollutants.  But although most people accept the existence of positional externalities as a
purely descriptive matter,
108 it might seem tempting to question whether such externalities
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are a proper basis for policy and law.  The principal objections involve, first, freedom and
rights and, second, the status of envy.
1. Freedom and rights. On one view, one person’s unhappiness about another’s
increased consumption simply does not constitute a legitimate ground for public action.
Smith may be unhappy that Jones consumes more than he does, but the solution is for
Smith to mind his own business.  On this view, to restrict Jones's consumption because it
makes Smith unhappy is essentially no different from telling Jones that he cannot engage
in other forms of private conduct to which Smith has some objection, such as reading
left-wing magazines, or dating people from another religion, or refusing to floss his teeth.
Jones is entitled to engage in such conduct, and that right trumps Smith’s concerns.
This objection has obvious rhetorical force; we may agree that the mere fact that
conduct is objectionable, or imposes offense, is no ground for legal intervention.  Yet the
objection elides many difficulties.
109 People who dislike conduct that they deem
objectionable are entitled to bargain with others to prevent them from engaging in that
conduct, and when cash payments are not made, implicit accommodations are made all
the time, so as to ensure that people do not give one another mutual offense. When
bargaining is possible, coercion should certainly be disfavored. But what the argument
from “rights” ignores is more fundamental than this -- the possibility that with respect to
relative position, people may well find themselves in a position in which they are
competing to their collective detriment, and some form of mutual restraint may make all,
or almost all, better off. Our claim is about a collective action problem, not about the
legitimacy of taxing people whenever they bother, offend, or irritate others.
Consider, for example, the job seeker who gains an advantage over his rivals by
showing up for his interview in an expensive, custom-tailored suit.  Acting as individuals,
the best response for his rivals may be to show up in expensive, custom-tailored suits as
well.  Even though all job seekers might strongly prefer the alternative in which all spent
less on their professional wardrobes, they are stuck with the extra expense.  If it were
somehow practical for all job seekers to meet and discuss the issue, they might vote
unanimously for a proposal to prohibit interviewees from showing up in a suit costing
more than, say, $300.  On what grounds might we then conclude that this proposal is
illegitimate?  Because it violates the individual job seeker's freedom?  That would be a
strange objection indeed if each job seeker had just voted in favor of the restriction.  If
each had wanted to restrict his own freedom in precisely this way, disallowing their
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An unhappy implication is that what is standardly seen as a Pareto improvement may not be a
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agreement would simply make them worse off – and in an important sense, and even in
the most important sense, diminish their freedom as well.
Some might object that such an agreement could never command unanimous
support in the first place.  Thus there would always be some people whose purpose in
wearing custom-tailored suits had nothing to do with wanting to gain advantage over
their fellow job seekers.  And because the restriction would make such persons worse off,
they could hardly be expected to support it.  As a practical matter, then, a proposal to
limit wardrobe expenses might receive a majority vote, but never a unanimous one.
Yet we do not require unanimity as a precondition for unquestionably legitimate
collective action in other spheres. There is no general power of veto on the part of
isolated losers.  Because most of us value cleaner air, for example, we require motorists
to maintain emission-control equipment on their cars, even though some motorists do not
care at all about air quality and would be delighted not to have to incur this extra cost.  In
these and other cases in which important common goals are at stake, we are prepared to
restrict what might seem to be individual freedom in the name of the greater good, one of
whose components is the perceived freedom of those who seek to emerge from a
prisoner’s dilemma.
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2. Envy?  One possible basis for denying the legitimacy of positional concerns is
that society has an interest in discouraging negative emotions, above all envy, and that in
any case it ought not to reward those who are envious. Perhaps the reason that some are
harmed by the income of others is that they are envious; and though envy is a genuine
hedonic loss, it might seem wrong to suggest that government has a legitimate interest in
taxing those who induce envy in others. To be sure, our argument for reassessing
willingness to pay would impose no tax on activities merely because they arouse envy.
But the logic of the argument might seem to support that conclusion.
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We do not attempt to answer here the complex question whether reducing envy is
a legitimate basis for social and legal policy.
112 On purely utilitarian grounds, it might
seem to be, except for the fact that rewarding envy may have unfortunate social
effects—by, for example, discouraging production and encouraging further envy, used
strategically or otherwise.
. At the same time, envy might have desirable social effects
insofar as it encourages productive activities.
113 For many people, the question of whether
envy should count as a social cost will undoubtedly depend partly on whether it is
unfairness that has produced the envy.
What is far more important for current purposes is that we have not been urging
attention to relative position on grounds of envy, for even the purely psychological
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consequences of inferior relative position often have nothing to do with envy. Envy
entirely to one side, the wealth and consumption of other people sets the frame of
reference for our evaluation of our own wealth and consumption, and this effect is
impossible to avoid.
114 The frame of reference is inevitably set socially, not individually,
and our experience of social goods – and to some extent our reputation and our self-
conception -- will be a function of that frame. In a remote mountain village in India,
people can function well without owning an automobile, yet a middle-class citizen in Los
Angeles cannot meet even the most minimal demands of social existence without one.
This point generalizes to a broad spectrum of goods.  When almost everyone has a
computer produced in, say, 2005, your computer from 1995 will not only seem hopelessly
slow and outdated, its performance will place you at a real competitive disadvantage; but
if everyone had computers built in 1995, little or nothing would be amiss. Envy is not
involved here; the problem is the frame of reference, which is not within any individual’s
control. The point holds for people at every level of the economic ladder, except the
extremely poor (for whom, it will be recalled, an absolute economic gain is always
important, subjectively as well as objectively). Indeed, some of the effects described here
appear driven largely by the same neurophysiological mechanisms that explain why a
Helsinki resident's evaluation of a 60-degree day in February is more favorable that a
Havana resident's evaluation of a 60-degree day in November.
Contextual forces of this general sort influence almost every conceivable
dimension of product quality evaluation.  Writing more than two centuries ago, for
example, Adam Smith introduced the important idea that local consumption standards
influence the goods and services that people consider essential (or “necessaries,” as
Smith called them).  In the following passage, for example, he described the factors that
influence the amount an individual must spend on clothing in order to be able appear in
public “without shame.”
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the
country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be
without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life.
The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no
linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable
day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want
of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it
is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in
the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The
poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public
without them.
115
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The absolute standard of living in the United States today is vastly higher than it
was in Adam Smith’s 18
th-century Scotland.  Yet Smith’s observations apply with equal
force to contemporary industrial societies.  Consider, for instance, the journalist Dirk
Johnson’s recent account of the experiences of Wendy Williams, a middle-school student
from a low-income family in Dixon, Illinois.
116
Watching classmates strut past in designer clothes, Wendy Williams sat
silently on the yellow school bus, wearing a cheap belt and rummage-sale slacks.
One boy stopped and yanked his thumb, demanding her seat.
"Move it, trailer girl," he sneered.
It has never been easy to live on the wrong side of the tracks. But in the
economically robust 1990's, with sprawling new houses and three-car garages
sprouting like cornstalks on the Midwestern prairie, the sting that comes with
scarcity gets rubbed with an extra bit of salt.
….
To be without money, in so many ways, is to be left out.
"I told this girl: 'That's a really awesome shirt. Where did you get it?'" said
Wendy, explaining that she knew it was out of her price range, but that she
wanted to join the small talk.  “And she looked at me and laughed and said, ‘Why
would you want to know?’"
A lanky, soft-spoken girl with large brown eyes, Wendy pursed her lips to
hide a slight overbite that got her the nickname Rabbit, a humiliation she once
begged her mother and father to avoid by sending her to an orthodontist.
For struggling parents, keenly aware that adolescents agonize over the
social pecking order, the styles of the moment and the face in the mirror, there is
no small sense of failure in telling a child that she cannot have what her
classmates take for granted.
"Do you know what it's like?" asked Wendy's mother, Veronica Williams,
"to have your daughter come home and say, 'Mom, the kids say my clothes are
tacky,’ and then walk off with her head hanging low.”
An adolescent in 18
th-century Scotland would not have been much embarrassed
by having a slight overbite, because not even the wealthiest members of society wore
braces on their teeth then.  Rising living standards have altered the frame of reference that
defines an acceptable standard of cosmetic dentistry.  The toll that low relative position
takes on individuals is no less legitimate because it occurs in psychological rather than
explicitly monetary terms.
To acknowledge that important economic, psychological, and even physical
rewards are significantly affected by the spending of others is simply to note an obvious
fact of the human condition.  Because each individual's consumption affects the frame
of reference within which others must make important choices, this frame of reference
is no less legitimate an object of public concern than the quality of our air and water.
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As a purely descriptive matter, concerns about relative position cause current
methods to underestimate public willingness to pay for risk reduction and a variety of
other benefits by substantial margins.  To the extent that we accept citizens’ preferences
as the basis for policy, we have every reason to believe that correcting for this bias will
lead to policy changes that meet public favor.
V. Limits and Extensions
In this section we venture some brief remarks on two questions that will
eventually deserve extended treatment. The first involves the fact that many regulations
involve subclasses of people, rather than (for example) all workers. The second involves
the implications of our argument for the much-discussed question of nonwaivable
contractual terms.
A. General and Less General Programs
Thus far we have written as if the effects of the program at issue will be felt by all
persons in the relevant class – as if an environmental regulation would reduce all income
by the same amount, or as if an occupational safety and health law would reduce
workers’ earnings at the same time and in the same way. When this is the case, the
regulation may produce something close to a Pareto improvement – holding relative
position constant with respect to income (and thus imposing little or no loss on that
dimension), but offering workers a benefit with respect to a nonpositional good (such as
safety or leisure time). Of course things are more complicated than this. Some
occupational and safety regulations, for example, will have distinct subclasses of workers
– as, for example, when a regulation of coal dust applies largely in the mining industry,
but without affecting most other workers at all,
117 or when a regulation of HIV
transmission affects workers in the dental and health care industries, but without applying
elsewhere.
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When regulation affects subclasses of workers, its positional effects will differ
from the ones we described above, where all lose in absolute position, but where relative
position is held constant. When subclasses are affected, some will gain in relative
position and some will lose.  Consider, for example, a safety regulation that applies only
to dental workers.  In contrast to a regulation that imposed an equally costly safety
requirement on all workers -- which, as noted above, does not affect relative living
standards -- this more limited regulation will reduce the relative living standards of dental
workers.  Thus, to the extent that the personal reference groups of dental workers consist
largely of non-dental workers, the regulation will make it more difficult for dental
workers to match the consumption standards that constitute their social frame of
reference.
In such cases, conventional estimates of how much individual dental workers are
willing to pay for the regulatory benefit may not significantly understate the social value
of the additional safety to dental workers. By hypothesis, the relative income of dental
workers is declining. Even in this case, however, the private willingness of dental
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workers will understate the social value of the regulation.  The reason is that the decline
in relative living standards experienced by dental workers is counterbalanced by an
increase in relative living standards experienced by others in their social comparison
group.  Relative position cannot be reduced in the aggregate.  When some lose position,
others necessarily gain.  One upshot is that if dental workers are armed with perfect
information, and if they know that their relative and absolute income will decline, a
regulation that affects dental workers alone is less likely to be popular among dental
workers than one that affects all workers in the relevant social comparison group.
Another upshot is that while the more general regulation may produce something close to
a Pareto improvement, with few real losers, the more targeted regulation cannot be
justified on that ground. If government is nonetheless to use numbers of the sort we are
urging, it will be on Kaldor-Hicks grounds – the gainers (including the gainers in terms of
relative position) are gaining more than the losers (including the losers in terms of
relative position) are losing.  In other words, there is a distributional shift, in terms of
relative position, with the more targeted regulation, whereas there is no such shift with
the general one.
In other cases, a regulation may not alter relative the relative position of those
affected by it, even though it applies only to a narrow occupational group.  For example,
if the relevant social comparison group for coal miners consists largely of other coal
miners, a safety regulation that applies only to coal miners would not alter relative
position within that group.
In practice, of course, most regulations are likely to fall somewhere along the
continuum between these extremes.  How, in such cases, is our analysis affected by the
fact that regulations target subclasses of people, and not everyone at once?  Although the
extent to which an individual’s private willingness to pay understates the social benefits
of a regulation generally will not vary with its breadth of coverage, the popularity of the
regulation among those directly affected will tend to be lower the more narrowly the
regulation is targeted.  Political resistance to safety regulation is thus likely to be greater
when regulation is done on a piecemeal basis than when it is proposed as part of a more
comprehensive package.  In addition, distributional concerns might be raised by
piecemeal regulation insofar as it alters existing relative positions.
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B. Extensions
The argument we have made has obvious implications for the question whether
law should impose nonwaivable terms – as, for example, through legislation involving
maximum hours, job security, parental leave, health care, and leave time. Let us continue
to assume that the cost of workers’ rights, when they are not waived, will be borne in
whole or in part by workers, in the sense that the legal grant of a right, to workers, will
result in a lower paycheck. The standard view is that if labor markets are generally
competitive, nonwaivable terms cannot be justified as promoting the interests of the
supposedly benefited class.
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We submit that the standard view is far too simple. If workers care about relative
position, nonwaivable rights might, in principle, make workers better off on the
dimension along which they are helped (by giving them something important) while also
not making them significantly worse off along the dimension along which they are
apparently harmed (by decreasing their income while also decreasing that of everyone
else). The promising possibility here is that legal initiatives will produce real gains of one
or another kind (for example, leisure time, health care, job security, which are, by
hypothesis, nonpositional goods), without producing real losses (because the only loss is
to absolute position in terms of income).
To offer slightly more detail: Assume that relative rather than absolute economic
position is what most workers care about – that worker well-being would not be
decreased by (say) a decrease in annual wages of $25, $50, or $100, so long as all
workers face the same decrease. In that event, some nonwaivable terms, such as a right to
job security, might be justified on the ground that the consequence of the new term is to
decrease absolute income but to hold relative income constant, thus imposing little or no
welfare loss on workers, while at the same time workers receive a substantial benefit,
e.g., job security. As far as the worker is concerned, the substantial benefit is given
essentially for free, because relative position is held constant – an apparently powerful
argument for a wide range of nonwaivable workers’ rights.
Of course this argument cannot be shown to be convincing in the abstract. It
raises several questions. Perhaps relative position is also what workers carry about with
respect to the new, legally granted benefit; perhaps this too is a positional good.
Undoubtedly most goods have a mixture of positional and nonpositional features. As we
have suggested, it does seem reasonable to say that many of the goods protected by
nonwaivable terms –- health care, vacation time, leisure, job security -- have strong
nonpositional features; it is important to have these things regardless of what other people
have.  At least these goods tend to be less observable than income, and also tend to be
valued in large part for their absolute qualities. Of course it is important to ask to what
extent income is actually a positional good for the relevant class of workers, since, for
very poor workers, absolute income may be what matters most.
Conclusion
Cost-benefit analysis is an increasingly pervasive practice within the national
government, and it promises to grow as a tool of decision in the next decades. The first
generation debates involved whether to do cost-benefit analysis at all. The second
generation debates, now at their inception, involve debates about appropriate valuation.
Our minimal submission here has been that the current numbers for regulatory
benefits are too low, because they neglect the fact that people care about relative income
position, not only absolute income position. In terms of the very framework used to
defend cost-benefit analysis, the current numbers should be increased. More
speculatively, we have suggested that the current numbers should be boosted by as much
as 75 percent. More conservatively, analysts might use the arguments offered here as a
rationale for choosing estimates near the upper end of the range of values produced by
contingent valuation and hedonic pricing methods.
We have also suggested that it is entirely legitimate for government to take
account of positional externalities, which create a prisoner’s dilemma for those subject to36
them. People care about relative position not only and not even mostly because of envy,
nor even because of status anxiety, but because the position of others sets a general frame
of reference within which economic and social activity takes place.
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The point bears not only on cost-benefit analysis, but also on a wide range of
regulatory possibilities, including nonwaivable terms in the labor market. If relative
position is what matters to most workers, nonwaivable terms, if generally imposed, may
turn out to be justified even if the result of such terms is to lower workers’ salaries. This
suggestion is a natural corollary of our basic suggestion here: Any approach to valuation
that concentrates solely on absolute economic position, and neglects relative economic
income position, will produce outcomes that are wrong in terms of the conventional
arguments that justify cost-benefit analysis in the first place.
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